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Fraud is a pervasive and challenging problem that costs society large amounts of
money. By no means all fraud is committed by ‘professional criminals’: much is done
by ordinary people who indulge in small-scale opportunistic deception. In this paper,
we set out to investigate when people behave dishonestly, for example by committing
fraud, in an online context. We conducted three studies to investigate how the rejection
of one’s efforts, operationalized in different ways, affected the amount of cheating and
information falsification. Study 1 demonstrated that people behave more dishonestly
when rejected. Studies 2 and 3 were conducted in order to disentangle the confounding
factors of the nature of the rejection and the financial rewards that are usually associated
with dishonest behavior. It was demonstrated that rejection in general, rather than the
nature of a rejection, caused people to behave more dishonestly. When a rejection was
based on subjective grounds, dishonest behavior increased with approximately 10%,
but this difference was not statistically significant. We subsequently measured whether
dishonesty was driven by the financial loss associated with rejection, or emotional
factors such as a desire for revenge. We found that rejected participants were just
as dishonest when their cheating did not led to financial gain. However, they felt
stronger emotions when there was no money involved. This seems to suggest that upon
rejection, emotional involvement, especially a reduction in happiness, drives dishonest
behavior more strongly than a rational cost-benefit analysis. These results indicate that
rejection causes people to behave more dishonestly, specifically in online settings. Firms
wishing to deter customers and employees from committing fraud may therefore benefit
from transparency and clear policy guidelines, discouraging people to submit claims that
are likely to be rejected.
Keywords: deception, dishonesty, rejection, insurance fraud, MTurk
INTRODUCTION
Fraud is a pervasive and expensive problem: estimates of the cost of fraud vary from under 1%
of GDP to over 10%, with the largest recent estimate of global fraud costs put at £7.22 trillion, or
one seventh of global GDP (Gee and Button, 2013). A more modest estimate suggests that fraud
is costing UK citizens approximately £1100 a year each (Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, 2014).
According to the UK Fraud Act, fraud consists of “dishonestly making a false representation with
the intent to make a gain for oneself or another, or to cause loss to someone else”: in short, “an act
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of deception intended for personal gain or to cause a loss to
another party,” as the Serious Fraud Office summarizes the law.
In this paper, we focus on deception in online settings.
A detailed study suggests that, while ‘technical’ offenses such as
payment card fraud, online banking fraud, and Internet fraud
have an annual cost of several 10s of pounds per citizen per year,
online versions of traditional offenses such as tax and welfare
fraud costs each citizen of a developed country 100s of pounds a
year (Anderson et al., 2012). And these are just the financial costs.
When the fraud victims are persons rather than institutions,
they can also experience negative psychological consequences,
increased physical and mental health issues and damage to their
relationships (Button et al., 2014). Motivated by the high direct
and indirect costs of fraud, a wide range of countermeasures have
been introduced (Alanezi and Brooks, 2014; Centre for Counter
Fraud Studies, 2014). These include increasing security and
surveillance, increasing awareness amongst potential victims and
calling for more vigorous prosecution of fraudsters (Anderson
et al., 2012; Purkait, 2012); they unfortunately also include
measures such as blaming fraud victims for their misfortune
(Cross, 2013). Although these measures may be rational from
the viewpoint of the actors who introduce them, they do not
always take the more irrational side of human nature into
account.
Not all fraud is committed by ‘professional criminals,’ that is by
individuals who earn their living through committing offenses.
Instead, both real-world case studies and experimental research
have shown that very few people lie and cheat to a pathological
extent (for an overview of experiments, see Ariely, 2012); instead
the majority of people are ‘opportunistic fraudsters’ who lie and
cheat a little. Padded expenses, inflated insurance claims, refunds
for goods wrongly said to have been defective, overtime payments
for tea breaks; the world of trade, commerce and employment
are beset with dishonest behavior. In a series of experiments
involving participants who tried to solve as many matrix puzzles
as they could within several minutes (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino
et al., 2009), it was consistently found that people overstate their
achievements by about 60% if they have the chance.
To prevent people from deceiving, we need to understand the
factors that cause people to behave dishonestly. The deterrence
of deception lies at the heart of most fraud countermeasures.
In the last decade, vibrant research on the deterrence of
deceit and dishonesty has emerged. This paper is aimed at
a better understanding of when dishonest behavior occurs.
Previous research has demonstrated that the extent to which
people behave dishonestly is affected by several factors including
individual differences, context and the environment. Creativity
is one example of an individual difference that is linked to
dishonesty. Creative people are more likely to behave dishonestly
(Gino and Ariely, 2012), and are also better at it (Vrij, 2008).
While individual differences can cause some people to be
more dishonest than others, situational factors can increase the
likelihood still further. Dishonesty tends to fluctuate during the
day (Kouchaki and Smith, 2014). Throughout the day, people
become more depleted, lowering their moral awareness and
self-control. Therefore, dishonesty tends to increase as the day
progresses. People tend to be more dishonest under certain
circumstances, for example when pursuing a goal (Schweitzer
et al., 2004), or in the presence of a bad example such as
counterfeit goods (Gino et al., 2010). The behavior of other
people can also influence a person’s tendency to act dishonestly.
For example, people are more likely to behave dishonestly when
witnessing an in-group member behaving dishonestly (Gino
et al., 2009), and when feeling socially rejected (Kouchaki and
Wareham, 2015). The latter effect was mediated by physiological
arousal, a finding that is in line with previous research suggesting
that feelings of anxiety can promote dishonesty (Kouchaki and
Desai, 2014). Therefore, non-social situations that elicit feelings
of anxiety may also elicit dishonest behavior.
These situational factors have in common that they can
be used to justify unethical behavior. Blasi (1980) identified
a psychological gap that can emerge when people’s moral
understanding and their moral actions are not aligned. A possible
explanation for the mental processes that go on when this
misalignment happens is the occurrence of ethical dissonance.
Ethical dissonance can be triggered by the desire to uphold
a positive moral self-image, and the temptation and potential
benefits associated with unethical behavior (Barkan et al., 2015).
The theory describes a conflict between two opposing factors:
on the one hand, people want to benefit as much as they can
and dishonesty may increase their benefits (Mazar et al., 2008),
while on the other hand they want to view themselves as good
and honest people (Aronson, 1969; Josephson Institute of Ethics,
2012). Behaving dishonestly may threaten their positive self-
concept, but this threat is mediated by the justification of this
immoral behavior. These justifications may occur both before
(i.e., anticipated ethical dissonance) and after unethical behavior
(i.e., experiences ethical dissonance; Shalvi et al., 2015). The
empirical evidence is that people are much more prepared to
cheat when the extra amount of money or working time is
relatively small or can otherwise be rationalized (Ariely, 2012).
Previous research has indicated that social rejection, and
the anxiety associated with this rejection, can lead to increased
dishonest behavior (Kouchaki and Wareham, 2015). However,
not all rejections are social in nature, and the effect of other types
of rejection on dishonest behavior remains unclear. In this paper,
we focus on the situation in which people’s efforts are rejected. We
investigate different aspects of the rejection. Specifically, we look
into the subjectivity of the rejection and the monetary reward
associated with the rejection.
So far, most research on factors that induce dishonest
behavior was carried out in the lab. Although lab studies
benefit from high experimental control, it remains unclear how
findings obtained in a lab translate to an online setting. In a
world where technological developments have enabled people to
increasingly perform a variety of activities online, it is important
to understand how an online context affects people’s behavior.
Previous dishonesty research has indicated that people may
behave differently when they act online. For example, in 15-min
long conversations, participants lied more often during online
conversations compared to face-to-face interactions (Zimbler
and Feldman, 2011). Therefore, we investigate whether the
rejection of one’s efforts also increases dishonesty in an online
setting. This may not only apply to dishonest behavior in general,
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but also specifically to the effect of the nature of a rejection on
dishonest behavior.
GENERAL MATERIALS AND METHODS
This paper contains three studies that were reviewed and
approved by the Research Ethics Committee of Cambridge
University’s Computer Laboratory. The studies were conducted
online. Each experiment started with an information sheet in
which participants were informed that they were about to
participate in an academic survey (Study 1) or study (Studies
2 and 3). In Study 1, participants were told that the survey
was designed to test the language proficiency of the American
population. The survey consisted of some general questions and
two language related tasks, one grammar and one semantic
task. For Studies 2 and 3, participants were told that they were
participating in a study to test a newly developed Automatic
Validation Tool and that the study involved answering some
general questions and filing a mock insurance claim. At this
stage, participants were not informed about the true nature of
the study, measuring dishonest behavior, because this knowledge
could influence their behavior. It was explained that the study
would start when clicking “next,” and that by doing so they gave
their consent to participating in the academic survey/study. At
the end of each study, participants were debriefed in writing
about the true purpose of the study, and we explained why
we could not reveal the deceptive nature of the research
earlier. We also asked participants not to share the true
nature of the study online until data collection was finished
in order to avoid data pollution. As part of the debriefing,
all participants were offered the opportunity to contact the
experimenters with any questions or complaints, or to retract
their data.
The experiments were conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), an online platform that is frequently used to
collect experimental research data. This recruitment channel was
deliberately chosen for two reasons. First, studying dishonest
behavior in an anonymous, online environment extends the
existing dishonesty literature. Second, experimental research has
shown that recruiting on MTurk leads to a representative sample
of the U.S. population (Berinsky et al., 2012). This is a more
varied participant sample than we would have been able to gather
at our university and the variety increases the generalizability of
the presented findings within the American population. Another
benefit of conducting experimental research on MTurk is the low
cost compared to lab experiments, without loss of validity. That
low pay does not influence the quality and nature of research
results was demonstrated by Paolacci et al. (2010), who replicated
a series of classic decision-making studies using MTurk and
found similar results to the more expensive original studies that
were collected in the lab. Similarly, in Ariely’s (2012) experiments,
increased financial incentives did not lead to an increase in
cheating.
We have studied the effect of different types of rejection
(objective, subjective, with promised financial reward, and
without) on ethical decision-making using two different types
of experimental research designs. We purposefully designed
experimental procedures that resembled real-life situations in
which the occurrence of dishonest behavior is prevalent. Study
1 comprises a language proficiency study, in which we measured
cheating behavior under truly experienced circumstances, while
Studies 2 and 3 were both vignette studies in an online
insurance claim context that involved participants responding to
a hypothetical rather than experienced scenario. Vignette studies
have been conducted in a wide range of disciplines including
teaching (Poulou, 2001) and nursing (Hughes and Huby, 2002),
and have proven particularly useful when studying sensitive
topics such as violence in residential care homes (Barter et al.,
2004), HIV risk in drug users (Hughes, 1998) and deception
(Schweitzer et al., 2004). Due to the sensitive nature of dishonest
behavior and insurance fraud, vignettes are a suitable research
method for this topic. Although reading a vignette will likely
differ from real-world experiences, experimental research has
demonstrated that vignettes can provide a sufficiently realistic
scenario to affect people’s responses (Hughes, 1998; Barter et al.,
2004). We additionally added a cover story about testing of our
newly developed Automatic Validation Tool to the vignette study
to increase the plausibility of our request.
Anxiety, for example when elicited by social rejection, has
been shown to affect dishonest behavior (Kouchaki and Desai,
2014; Kouchaki and Wareham, 2015). Because anxiety may also
play a mediating role in our rejection manipulation, we invited
participants in all three studies to self-report how they felt before
and after our manipulation. This allowed for measuring how
participants were affected by own rejection manipulation, and
whether the elicited emotions mediated the effect of rejection
on dishonesty. Additionally, in the first study participants also
reported how they felt after the cheating opportunity, to measure
if cheating affected how people feel. Dishonesty was measured
dichotomously based on actual cheating (Study 1) and lying
(Studies 2 and 3) behavior.
STUDY 1
Methods and Materials
Participants and Design
One hundred and sixty-nine American MTurk workers
participated in an online study on the effect of unfair rejection on
people’s mood and cheating behavior. Although the majority of
MTurk data is of high quality, some MTurk participants provide
random answers. In order to identify these data polluters, we
identified several check questions in each study. In Study 1,
participants had to answer all 10 grammar questions correctly.
This conservative criterion was required to operationalize the
rejection of effort, see Section “Procedure” in Study 1. Thirteen
people failed to answer the 10 questions correctly and were
removed from the dataset, leaving 156 participants (94 female;
age 18–79, M = 33.85, SD = 13.01). Of these, three participants
did not have English as their native language. Participation took
on average 12 min and participants received $1.70 for their time,
consisting of a basic payment of $0.50 and a $1.20 bonus that
each participant eventually received.
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This study is a between-subjects design, measuring the effect
of unfair rejection on cheating (cheating vs. no cheating).
Procedure
Participants accessed our website via the MTurk platform and
were told that it was a study of English language proficiency,
consisting of a grammar test and a semantics test. More
specifically, the study was framed as a state-dependent retrieval
study (i.e., the memory phenomenon that retrieval performance
is affected by the mood and state during which the memories were
initially formed; Eich, 1995), in which the effect of mood on test
performance would be measured. State-dependent learning was
the cover for asking participants to report their feelings regarding
five different emotions on a 7-point Likert scale (i.e., happy, sad,
guilty, frustrated, and anxious) three times: before and after the
feedback (accept or rejection) and after the cheating opportunity.
The first two mood questionnaires served a dual purpose. First,
they served as a manipulation check, measuring the effect of
rejection on participants’ feelings. The self-reported emotion
ratings serve as a proxy for the perception of the treatment.
The second purpose of the first two mood questionnaires was
to identify whether the experienced emotions mediate the effect
between rejection and cheating. The third questionnaire was
included to measure whether the act of cheating affected people’s
feelings.
The study started with demographic questions, and was
subsequently divided into two parts: the grammar and semantics
tests. Participants were told that they would receive a $0.60
bonus if they answered all 10 multiple-choice grammar questions
correctly. The grammar questions served as a conservative check,
and to ensure that participants had invested time and effort
before their efforts were rejected. The 10 grammar questions
also made our cover story of a language proficiency test more
plausible. When participants failed to answer the 10 questions
correctly, they received feedback that they would not receive
the bonus. As this setting was not a planned manipulation, we
excluded these trials from the analysis. Of the participants that
answered all 10 questions correctly, half were provided with false
feedback that they had answered the final question incorrectly
(i.e., rejection condition). The other half did not receive such
feedback and were told that they would receive the bonus for
this part of the study (i.e., accept condition). Subsequently,
participants were asked to provide the definitions of three words.
For each correct definition, participants were promised $0.20,
with a total of $0.60 if all three definitions were correct. The three
words were chosen based on the results of a pilot study in which
we investigated what words people do and do not know. Forty-
seven were tested, and four participants were removed because
they failed to answer the check questions correctly, leaving 43
participants (15 female; age 18–68, M = 37.21, SD = 14.48).
We intended to include two words that all people know, and
one word that no one knows. The pilot results indicated that
people are familiar with the words ‘goal’ and ‘employee,’ but not
with the word ‘kench.’ A kench is a deep bin to salt fish and
animal skins, used by fishermen and sailors in the 18 hundreds.
Today the word is obsolete and is unknown to the general
population.
During Study 1, it was explicitly stated on the website that
participants were taking part in a language proficiency test, and
that looking up the correct answer was not allowed. Therefore,
cheating was defined as providing the correct answer to the
‘unknown’ target word kench. Twenty-eight participants cheated
by providing the correct definition of kench. We also observed
another source of unethical behavior, when people quit the
experiment with the presumed intention to start over to avoid
missing out on the bonus. We had purposefully designed the
website such that the back button was disabled and people could
only participate from the same IP-address once. Consequently,
participants did not succeed when attempting to access the
experiment website for a second time. These measures were
explicitly explained to all participants and were taken in order
to avoid people going back to the previous page to change their
answer after receiving the feedback. In total, 13 participants quit
after receiving the feedback, and all quitting participants were
part of the rejection condition. While participants could quit for
other reasons, several participants emailed the experimenter to
indicate their intention to start over the study in order to obtain
the bonus. Excluding these participants from the dataset would
provide a skewed view because it concerns meaningful rather
than randomly missing data. Instead of omitting these 13 quitters
from the analysis or treating them as cheaters, we consider
Behaving Unethically as the broad class of dishonest behaviors,
including cheating and quitting. In total, 41 people behaved
unethically. After the cheating opportunity, participants were
debriefed about the true purpose of the study. All participants
received the full bonus of $1.20, regardless of performance
and previous feedback. This decision was made in consultation
with our ethics committee. This way, all participants were
treated equally as payment was not dependent on experimental
condition. Because participants were not made aware of this until
the data collection was finished, it should not have affected the
results.
Results and Discussion
To measure whether our rejection affected people’s mood,
participants were invited three times to indicate on a ‘not
at all’ (1) to ‘very much’ (7) Likert scale how happy, sad,
anxious, guilty, and frustrated they felt: before (time 1) and
after (time 2) the feedback, and after the subsequent cheating
opportunity (time 3). Five repeated-measures ANOVAs with
Treatment (accept vs. reject) as the independent variable
and five self-reported mood measures on times 1 and 2
as the dependent variables revealed four interaction effects,
indicating our rejection manipulation was successful. Specifically,
participants reported: (i) feeling less happy after being rejected,
F(1,147) = 109.28, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.43; but, (ii) more sad
when rejected, F(1,147) = 23.69, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.14; (iii)
more frustrated, F(1,147) = 94.67, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.39;
and, (iv) more anxious, F(1,147) = 12.94, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.08. However, guilt was not affected; see Figure 1, for a
graphical interpretation of the results. Overall, these self-reported
mood results indicate that participants’ mood was negatively
affected by the rejection. To measure whether rejection also
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promoted unethical behavior, a chi-square analysis of Treatment
on Unethical Behavior was performed. As demonstrated in
Figure 2, people behave more unethically after rejection (33.3%)
compared to being accepted (18.7%), X2(2) = 4.32, n = 156,
p = 0.046, 8 = −0.17. The difference between these two
conditions was predominantly caused by the participants that
quit the experiment. In the accept condition, 14 out of 75
participants cheated (i.e., 61 participants did not cheat). In the
unfair rejection condition, 27 out of 81 participants behaved
unethically (i.e., 54 participants did not), of which 14 participants
cheated by providing the correct definition of kench and 13
quit early. Because the latter group did not complete the
mood questionnaires, it was not possible to run a mediation
analysis to determine whether mood mediated the effect
between rejection and dishonesty. Finally, to measure whether
behaving unethically affected people’s emotions, a MANOVA
was performed of Unethical Behavior and Treatment on five
self-reported mood measures on time 3. This test revealed
that people’s emotions after the cheating opportunity were
affected by Treatment, F(5,136) = 6.89, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.20,
but not by Unethical Behavior, F(5,136) = 1.32, p = 0.260,
η2p = 0.05.
A first interesting finding is that cheating in itself did not
cause an emotional response. One of the main theories of the
detection of deceit is based on the assumption that lying can
FIGURE 1 | The effect of Treatment on self-reported Mood (Study 1).
FIGURE 2 | The effect of Treatment on Unethical behavior (Study 1).
cause an emotional response (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, 2008).
One hypothetical explanation for this discrepancy between the
literature and our finding is that in our study participants cheated
(looked up a word while this was not allowed) rather than lied
(provide falsified information). Although lying and cheating are
both dishonest behaviors, they may elicit different responses.
Alternatively, dishonest behavior in general does not always
cause an emotional response, for example when there is little at
stake. In our study, there were no clear negative consequences
to getting caught cheating. If dishonesty does not necessarily
elicit an emotion response, this would have consequences for the
generalizability of the emotional approach as the base for a lie
detection method. This hypothesis has found some support in the
deception community, which has shifted from an emotion-based
lie detection approach to a cognitive load-based approach over
the last decade (Vrij et al., 2015). Future research is needed to
investigate the emotional response to different types of dishonest
acts in order to determine the generalizability of an emotion-
based lie detection approach.
The second interesting finding is that rejection caused both
more negative emotions and more dishonest behavior in this
online cheating environment. We operationalized rejection by
unfairly rejecting the participants’ correct answers and thereby
taking away their financial reward. That this rejection was
perceived as a negative experience was demonstrated by the self-
reported mood data; rejection caused people to feel sad, anxious,
frustrated, and unhappy. However, based on the current data
we cannot determine whether the negative emotional response
mediated the effect between rejection and cheating. Therefore,
for Study 2, we implemented a new research design in which
participants could not cheat by quitting halfway through the
experiment. In addition, participants in the current study were
rejected on unfair grounds (i.e., although participants answered
all questions correctly, they were told they made a mistake and
therefore missed out on the financial reward). Therefore, we
cannot determine whether rejection in general, or the perceived
unfairness of the rejection caused the dishonest behavior. To
test whether rejection in general, or the nature of a rejection
causes people to behave dishonestly, we conducted a second
experiment in which participants were rejected based on objective
or subjective criteria.
STUDY 2
Methods and Materials
Participants and Design
One hundred and forty-four American MTurk workers
participated in an online study on the effect of objective and
subjective rejections on people’s mood and lying behavior. We
selected a situation in which dishonesty can occur, and that
can leave people with feelings of unfairness: filing an online
insurance claim (Derrig, 2002; Topham, 2014). Participants filed
a mock insurance claim form. General questions about the trip,
such as departure airport and holiday destination, served as
check questions. Seven MTurk workers failed to answer these
questions correctly and were removed from the dataset, leaving
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137 participants (75 female; age 19–72, M = 35.15, SD = 11.25).
Participation took on average 14 min and participants received
$1.00 for their time, consisting of a basic payment of $0.50 and a
$0.50 bonus that every participant eventually received.
This study is a between-subjects design, measuring the effect of
verdict (accept, objective reject vs. subjective reject) on falsifying
information (falsified vs. not falsified information).
Procedure
Participants accessed our website via the MTurk platform and
were told that this study was designed to test the accuracy and
usability of an Automatic Validation Tool for online insurance
claims. We asked participants to imagine that their backpack was
stolen during a holiday trip in Europe, and they were asked to
file a mock insurance claim form for this stolen backpack. To
ensure consistency between sessions, participants were provided
with a scenario describing how their backpack was stolen, and
they received an overview of the main guidelines of ‘their’ travel
insurance. This information was accessible through a pop-up
menu whilst completing the insurance claim to ensure that
participants would not make mistakes due to memory errors,
rather than the deliberate falsification of information. To mimic
a real-world situation, participants were promised a monetary
reward (i.e., $0.50 bonus) upon claim acceptance. Both the
insurance claim form and the policy guidelines were based on
information provided by a large UK-based insurance company.
The scenario, policy guidelines and claim form can be found at
https://www.projects.science.uu.nl/lyingfeelsright/. Participants
were also asked to complete two mood questionnaires, once
before filing the claim and once after hearing the verdict on their
claim, followed by the lie opportunity during which participants
could falsify information on their insurance claim in order to get
the claim accepted. Participants were led to believe this mood
questionnaire to be part of testing the usability of the Automatic
Validation Tool, while it actually was aimed at measuring whether
people’s feelings were affected by a rejected claim.
The study started with demographic questions, followed by the
presentation of the scenario and policy guidelines. Subsequently,
participants filed an insurance claim based on the backpack
scenario. After submitting their claim, participants saw the
following message for several seconds: “Please wait a moment.
We are now automatically checking the content of your insurance
claim. Do not push the back button or refresh.” This message
was followed by the verdict on their claim. After the verdict,
people had the possibility to complain and/or make changes
to their claim if they believed the Automatic Validation Tool
had misunderstood what happened. Falsifying information (i.e.,
behaving dishonestly) was defined as submitting information that
diverged from the information presented in the scenario, which
could help participants get their claim accepted and win a reward.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three Verdict
conditions: accept, objective rejection and subjective rejection.
In the accept condition, participants were told that, based on
information they provided, their claim got accepted and that they
would receive the bonus. In the objective rejection condition,
participants were told that their claim was rejected because they
had violated the maximum journey limit of 31 days. The scenario
in all conditions was identical, except for the length of the
journey in the objective rejection, which was 5 weeks instead of
three, exceeding the insurance policy journey limit. We designed
the violation of maximum journey length because it concerns
a clearly-stated, common policy guideline, and one familiar to
the general public. It can therefore be regarded as an objective
rejection. Although this rejection was based on objective policy
guidelines, participants still had the opportunity to cheat because
they could change their departure or return date, or mention that
they notified the insurance company of their extended journey
beforehand.
The subjective rejection was based on the wide interpretation
of the ambiguous statement that “people should take care to look
after their personal possessions, in particular their valuables.”
Participants were told that their claim was rejected because, based
on the provided information, the conclusion had been drawn that
they had been negligent in taking care of their possessions. There
is no clear description of what behaviors do and do not count
as negligence, making this a subjective rejection. Participants
could falsify information by fabricating more convincing ways
(i.e., not described in the provided scenario) in which they
had taken care of their backpack. For example, one participant
claimed that he had not left the backpack out of his sight, while
it was clearly stated in the scenario that he/she only realized
the backpack was missing when he/she was about to leave the
restaurant. For each participant, a coder determined whether any
information in the statement contradicted information provided
in the scenario. For the objective rejection condition, this
included mentioning incorrect dates and prior contact with the
insurance company. For the subjective rejection, this included
mentioning contact with the thief, keeping the backpack in
sight at all times, and incorrect information about the location
of their backpack. Other statements that participants made to
increase the chances of getting their claim accepted, but which
did not contradict information from the scenario such as claims
of being an honest and careful person and portraying feelings
of unfair treatment were not interpreted as false information.
After the lie opportunity, participants were debriefed about the
true purpose of the study, and all participants received the $0.50
bonus.
Results and Discussion
In line with Study 1, to measure participants’ emotions, five
repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed with Verdict (i.e.,
accept, objective reject, and subjective reject) as the independent
variable and the five self-reported Mood questions as the
dependent variables. Results indicated with five interaction effects
that participants’ mood was negatively affected by rejection in
general, and that the nature of the rejection did not matter.
Specifically, participants reported: (i) feeling less happy when
getting rejected in general, compared to getting their claim
accepted, F(2,134) = 73.13, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.52; but, (ii) more
sad when getting rejected in general, compared to getting their
claim accepted, F(2,134)= 21.78, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25; (iii) more
guilty when the rejection was subjective, compared to an objective
rejection and acceptance, F(2,134) = 7.34, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.10;
(iv) more frustrated when rejected in general, compared to
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getting accepted, F(2,134) = 58.43, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.47;
and, (v) more anxious when rejected in general, compared to
getting accepted, F(2,134) = 4.17, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.02. See
Figure 3, for a graphical interpretation of the results. These self-
reported results indicate that, overall, participants’ mood was
negatively affected by claim rejection, regardless of the nature
of this rejection. Feelings of guilt were the only exception, as
participants who were subjectively rejected felt guiltier after this
than participants who were rejected based on measurable criteria
or who were not rejected at all. A follow-up correlational analysis
of Falsified information on self-reported Guilt in participants
in the subjective rejection condition revealed that guilt was not
induced by the dishonest behavior (i.e., falsifying information on
the insurance claim form), r = 0.03, n= 47, p= 0.861.
To measure whether rejection promoted dishonest behavior,
a chi-square analysis of Verdict on the dependent variable
Falsified information (i.e., yes or no) was performed. As
demonstrated in Figure 4, people lie more after being rejected
based on subjective criteria (23.4%) compared to rejection
based on objective criteria (14.9%), and getting accepted (0%),
X2(2) = 10.97, n = 137, p = 0.004, 8 = 0.28. To identify
whether rejection in general caused this effect, or whether
the nature of the rejection played a role as well, we ran
an additional chi-square analysis in which we removed the
accept condition. Results demonstrate that although participants
falsified information more often when rejected subjectively by
8.5%, this difference between the two reject conditions was
not significant, X2(1) = 1.09, n = 94, p = 0.294, 8 = 0.11.
We next conducted a multiple mediation analysis following
procedures by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to test whether self-
reported mood (i.e., happiness, sadness, guilt, frustration, and
anxiety) mediates the effect of rejection on dishonest behavior.
We ran a bootstrapping analysis (5000 iterations) with the five
mood variables simultaneously in the model and results indicated
that only happiness [0.081 1.003] mediated the effect between
rejection and dishonest behavior. The 95% bias corrected
confidence intervals of sadness, guilt, frustration, and anxiety
included zero, suggesting that these variables did not have a
mediating effect.
In summary, rejection in general (i.e., regardless of the nature
of this rejection), leads to negative emotions and more dishonest
behavior. To which extent the nature of a rejection increases
dishonest behavior, is a topic for further research. Participants
falsified information more often and, independently, experienced
more feelings of guilt when the rejection was based on subjective
reasons. However, the chi-square analysis did not support this
finding. Whether the difference in dishonesty between objective
and subjective rejections was not significant due to a lack
of power, or because dishonesty is predominantly driven by
rejection rather than the nature of the rejection, cannot be
determined based on the current data.
In the previous two studies, rejection always led to financial
loss. Participants were also aware that they would profit
financially from cheating (i.e., looking up the correct definition)
and lying (i.e., falsifying information on an insurance claim to
increase the chance of claim acceptance). Therefore, based on
the results from Studies 1 and 2, we cannot disentangle whether
people behaved dishonestly to compensate for their previous
financial loss, or due to the rejection and negative emotions
elicited by these rejections. We wondered, would this behavior
change if there were no financial incentives associated with
dishonesty? In other words, are people just trying to get back the
money that was unfairly taken for them, or are they emotionally
seeking revenge?
FIGURE 3 | The effect of Verdict on self-reported Mood (Study 2).
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FIGURE 4 | The effect of Verdict on the percentage of participants that
falsified information (i.e., lying; Study 2).
STUDY 3
In the third and final experiment we tackled the confounding
effect that dishonesty will often lead to financial gain (Greenberg,
1993; Houser et al., 2012; Kline et al., 2014); we removed
the financial incentive to cheat in order to investigate whether
financial incentives are the main motivator for people’s behavior
when they have been rejected, based on either objective or
subjective criteria.
Methods and Materials
Participants and Design
One hundred and seventy-nine American MTurk workers
participated in an online study on the effect of rejection and
monetary rewards on people’s mood and lying behavior. Three
participants failed to answer the check questions that were based
on general scenario information correctly and were removed
from the dataset, leaving 176 participants (110 female; age 18–68,
M = 36.81, SD = 12.29). Participation took on average 14 min
and participants received $1.00 for their time, consisting of a
basic payment of $0.50 and a $0.50 bonus that every participant
received.
This study is a 3 × 2 between-subjects design, measuring the
effect of verdict (accept, objective reject vs. subjective reject) and
bonus (bonus vs. bonus-after) on falsifying information (falsified
vs. not falsified information).
Procedure
The procedure of Study 3 follows the procedure of Study 2 with
one exception. Instead of telling all participants at the beginning
of the experiment that they would receive a $0.50 bonus upon
claim acceptance, half of the participants were not told about
the bonus until the debriefing. In other words, participants in
the bonus-after condition were not promised any financial bonus
during the experiment and were only made aware of the existence
of the bonus upon completion of the experiment. This way,
we could measure the effect of a prospective bonus on mood
and lying behavior. After the lie opportunity, participants were
debriefed about the true purpose of the study, and all participants,
including the participants in the bonus-after condition, received
the $0.50 bonus at the end of the study.
Results and Discussion
To measure if our Bonus manipulation affected participants’
emotions, five repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted with
Verdict (i.e., accept, objective reject, and subjective reject),
and Bonus (i.e., bonus and bonus-after), as the independent
variables and five self-reported Mood questions as the dependent
variables. The mood results from Study 2 were replicated
with five interaction effects, indicating that participants’ mood
was negatively affected by getting a claim rejected in general,
regardless of the nature of a rejection. Specifically, participants
reported: (i) feeling less happy when getting rejected in general,
compared to accepted, F(2,170) = 84.57, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50;
but, (ii) more sad when getting their claim rejected in general,
compared to accepted, F(2,170) = 33.61, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28;
(iii) more guilty when rejected in general, F(2,170) = 4.89,
p = 0.009, η2p = 0.05; (iv) more frustrated when rejected in
general, F(2,170) = 49.40, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.37; and, (v) more
anxious when rejected in general, F(2,170) = 20.48, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.19. See Figures 5–7 for graphical interpretations of these
results. Importantly, in addition to Verdict, Bonus also affected
FIGURE 5 | The effect of Bonus on self-reported Mood in the Accept
condition (Study 3).
FIGURE 6 | The effect of Bonus on self-reported Mood in the Objective
rejection condition (Study 3).
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FIGURE 7 | The effect of Bonus on self-reported Mood in the
Subjective Rejection condition (Study 3).
people’s mood. Participants reported feeling less happy after
hearing the verdict about their claim when they were not aware
of the bonus (M = 3.37, SD = 2.22), compared to situations
in which participants received a bonus upon claim acceptance
(M = 3.78, SD = 2.20), F(1,170) = 4.57, p = 0.034, η2p = 0.03.
Participants also reported feeling more guilty after hearing the
verdict in the bonus-after condition (M = 2.00, SD = 1.48),
compared to scenarios where participants received a bonus,
(M = 1.62, SD = 1.15), F(1,170) = 4.85, p = 0.029, η2p = 0.03.
Lastly, participants reported feeling more anxious after hearing
the verdict in the bonus-after condition (M = 3.23, SD = 2.13),
compared to the bonus condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.99),
F(1,170)= 14.52, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.08. These self-reported mood
results indicate that, overall, participants’ mood was negatively
affected when their claim was rejected, regardless of the nature of
this rejection. These results also indicate that people felt emotions
more strongly when there was seemingly no money involved (i.e.,
decreased happiness, increased guilt and anxiety).
To measure whether a monetary bonus not only affected
people’s mood, but also their tendency to behave dishonestly,
a loglinear analysis of Verdict (i.e., accept, objective reject, and
subjective reject), and Bonus (i.e., bonus and bonus-after) on
Falsified information (i.e., yes or no) was performed. In other
words, we analyzed if people’s tendency to lie was dependent
on monetary rewards and the nature of their claim rejection.
In line with standard practice, 0.5 was added to all cells to
avoid performing calculations with empty cells. The loglinear
regression revealed that the highest order three-way model did
not retain all effects. Instead, the best fit was a second-order
model, X2(0) = 0, p = 1, including a two-way interaction
effect between Verdict and Falsified information, X2(5) = 28.08,
n = 176, p < 0.001. A separate chi-square analysis of Verdict
on Falsified information demonstrated a significant difference
between the conditions unfairly rejected (29.8%), fairly rejected
(20.0%), and accepted (0%), X2(2) = 19.56, n = 176, p < 0.001,
8 = 0.33, see Figure 8. Although participants in the subjective
reject condition cheated almost 10% more (and relatively 49%
more) than participants in the objective reject condition, this
FIGURE 8 | The effect of Verdict and Bonus on the percentage of
participants that falsified information (i.e., lying; Study 3).
effect did not differ significantly when tested without the accept
condition, X2(1) = 1.51, n = 117, p = 0.219, 8 = 0.11. The
influence of Bonus on Falsified Information was not further
tested because these factors were not included in the best fitting
loglinear regression model. We next conducted two multiple
mediation analyses to test whether self-reported mood (i.e.,
happiness, sadness, guilt, frustration, and anxiety) mediates the
effect of rejection on dishonest behavior. Because the presence or
seemingly absence of a bonus influenced how rejection affected
people’s mood, we split the file up based on Bonus condition and
ran two separate analyses. We ran two bootstrapping analyses,
one for the bonus and one for the bonus-after condition (5000
iterations each) with the five mood variables simultaneously in
the model. Results indicated that none of the emotions mediated
the effect of rejection on subsequent dishonest behavior.
In conclusion, the mood results demonstrate that people
experienced the negative emotions associated with rejection more
strongly when there was no financial reward involved, although
these strong emotions did not subsequently increase dishonest
behavior. Dishonesty was also not affected by the presence of
a financial reward, or by the nature of the rejection. Instead,
rejections in general fueled dishonest behavior. So the absence of
money made people care more, but it did not spark dishonesty:
being rejected did.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In previous research, dishonesty was often quantified as cheating
(Houser et al., 2012) or stealing (Greenberg, 1993). Because
dishonesty encompasses more behaviors than just stealing and
cheating, dishonest behavior in this paper was not only quantified
as cheating (i.e., on a test; Study 1), but also as falsifying
information (i.e., on a mock insurance claim; Studies 2 and 3).
These types of dishonest behaviors are, for example, relevant in
the applied context of insurance claims. Because insurance claims
are nowadays often filed online, the studies in this paper were
conducted using the online platform Mechanical Turk.
In three studies, we have investigated whether the rejection
of one’s efforts elicits dishonest behavior in an online setting.
In Study 1, we pretended to run a language proficiency study
and rejected the efforts of half of the participants by providing
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them with negative feedback about their performance. People
who were rejected subsequently engaged more often in unethical
behavior when they got the chance than people who did
not previously got rejected. Although this study provided an
interesting insight in online dishonest behavior, we discovered
two possibly confounding factors. First, because participants in
the reject condition were rejected unfairly (i.e., although they
had answered all questions correctly, they were told they made
a mistake), we could not determine whether the rejection in
itself, or the nature of the rejection caused the rise in dishonest
behavior. Second, the rejection resulted in financial loss, which
meant we could not determine whether the rejection, or the
financial loss associated with the rejection caused people to
behave dishonestly. In Study 2, we tested whether the nature
of the rejection, operationalized as rejection based on objective
or subjective criteria, affected dishonest behavior. In Study 3,
we investigated the role of financial rewards in the motivations
for dishonest behavior. These two studies were conducted in
an online insurance claim environment for its relevance in
our current society. Results indicated that across experiments,
the rejection, rather than the nature of a rejection, promoted
dishonest behavior. Although participants cheated approximately
10% more (a relative difference of 49%) after being rejected for
subjective reasons compared to objective criteria, this difference
was not statistically significant. Based on the current data we
cannot determine whether the nature of a rejection simply does
not affect dishonest behavior, or whether the lack of effect was
due to a lack in power. Other papers investigating the effect of
treatment on dishonesty experienced similar power problems.
For example, the difference in dishonest behavior between the
fair and unfair condition in Houser et al.’s (2012) study was only
marginally significant with a sample size of 500+. This suggests
that the effect size of fairness on dishonesty may be relatively
small. Regardless, decreasing dishonest behavior in the context of
insurance claims with a few percent can still lead to large financial
benefits, making this topic worth exploring.
When removing the financial rewards associated with
dishonest behavior, participants still made an effort to falsify
information, suggesting that dishonesty is not just caused by an
attempt to get restorative justice for missing out. Although having
a financial reward associated with accepted claims – as is common
in real-life insurance claims – affected people’s feelings, it did not
affect dishonest behavior. These results support previous theory
(Ariely, 2012) and experimental results (Mazar et al., 2008) on
the irrationality of dishonesty, which demonstrates that people
do not base their decision to behave dishonestly on a rational
cost-benefit analysis. We tested this by adding the bonus-after
condition in Study 3, so in the perception of the participants we
removed the (financial) benefits of acting dishonestly, while the
costs in terms of effort did not change. If people were rational
economic actors, the seemingly absence of financial rewards
would have stopped them from cheating. However, dishonest
behavior was not affected. Rather, when there are no financial
gains in prospect, emotional involvement was larger. It is as if
playing for honor is more important than playing for money.
When unaware of any prospective reward, participants indicated
feeling less happy, and more guilty and anxious after hearing the
verdict about their claim than people who had hoped for financial
benefits. Importantly, although the financial benefits in Study 3
were small, they still elicited emotional and behavioral changes.
Larger incentives would not necessarily have increased this effect,
just as Ariely (2012) demonstrated that increasing the financial
incentive did not lead to increased cheating. Moreover, Ruedy
et al. (2013) replaced the financial incentive with a more personal
incentive to cheat by linking success on the test to intelligence
and professional success in life and found that people cheated
significantly more when their self-esteem was at stake.
A theory that may help explain these irrational dishonesty
results is ‘ethical dissonance’ (Barkan et al., 2015), a theory that
is related to the general ‘cognitive dissonance’ theory by Festinger
(1957) in which internal consistency is threatened by two or
more conflicting beliefs and ideas. Specifically, in our insurance
claim studies, ethical dissonance may have occurred when people
tried to justify to themselves why they spent time and effort (i.e.,
adding feedback and falsifying information on the claim form)
without any potential benefits (i.e., no monetary bonus). The
friction caused by these conflicting beliefs may then be solved by
stating that they made this effort because they care (i.e., higher
emotional involvement). The ethical dissonance theory (Barkan
et al., 2015) describes how people feel torn between wanting to
be a good person (Aronson, 1969; Josephson Institute of Ethics,
2012), and wanting the benefits of behaving dishonestly (Mazar
et al., 2008). Although we did not directly ask participants how
they felt about themselves in order to avoid priming (dis)honest
behavior (Mazar et al., 2008; Shu et al., 2012), the implemented
mood questionnaires can be used as an indication of their mental
states. In previous research, dishonest behavior has been linked
both to eliciting negative emotions such as guilt (Massi, 2005)
and to eliciting positive affect (Ruedy et al., 2013). Here, the
mood results from the first study showed that cheating did not
affect people’s emotions, suggesting that our participants may
have been effective at justifying their dishonest behavior. This
is key, because dishonesty can be a slippery slope (Lerman,
2002; Ariely, 2012). If people can behave dishonestly and still
feel good or even better (Ruedy et al., 2013) about themselves,
they might be more likely to behave dishonestly again in the
future.
The chosen experimental designs have several benefits
including the ability to test multiple types of dishonest behavior.
This allowed us to investigate aspects of dishonesty that go
beyond simple tasks such as reporting the outcome of a coin
toss (Houser et al., 2012), and analyze dishonest behavior in
more realistic settings. However, when participants complete a
study on their own computers, this typically reduces the amount
of experimental control. Specifically in Study 1, we could not
distinguish between participants who quit in an attempt to cheat,
and those who quit for other reasons such as frustration or lack
of trust in the system. In Studies 2 and 3, participants might have
reported more negative emotions, not as the sole result of the
feedback decision, but caused by a discrepancy between behavior
dictated by their assignment, and the behavior that would have
led to the highest gain. More specifically, when participants
in the objective rejection condition filled out the travel dates
conscientiously, their claim would get rejected. While the online
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insurance fraud scenario provides both realism and a structured
experimental testing mechanism for dishonest behavior, the
scenarios and instructions may have posed conflicting incentives
for the participants. In addition, much dishonesty research shows
that people usually cheat and lie a little (Ariely, 2012; Houser
et al., 2012). The complete absence of falsifying information in the
accept conditions of Studies 2 and 3 is likely to have been caused
by the choice of experimental design because claim acceptance,
and therefore pay-off, was quantified as a binary decision. In
other words, an accepted claim led to the highest achievable
monetary reward and therefore did not require participants to
falsify additional details, whilst in real life people could still inflate
their claim a little, and thus receive more money.
The consistency of our dishonesty findings across three studies
and two research designs strengthens our belief that people
behave more dishonestly after rejection, specifically in an online
environment. In an applied setting, this would imply that firms
should try to minimize the amount of rejected claims, for example
through heightened transparency and clearer communication
of acceptance guidelines. When it is upfront clear whether a
claim is likely to be accepted or not, people may submit less
claims that clearly violate policy guidelines, leading to a reduction
in rejection and thus subsequent dishonest behavior. Despite
the lack of a statistically significant difference, likelihood ratios
indicated that the nature of a rejection may contribute to the
elicitation of dishonest behavior as well. Because even a small
decrease in fraudulent insurance claims can lead to a large
savings, stating the rejection policy more clearly could not only
reduce the amount of rejected claims, it may also further reduce
dishonest behavior when people feel that they were rejected on
objective grounds.
Although rejection did cause people to feel more negative (i.e.,
less happy, more sad, frustrated, and anxious), this emotional
response did not have a strong effect on dishonest behavior.
The mediation analyses of Studies 2 and 3 indicated that the
majority of emotions did not affect dishonesty as a mediator
(i.e., indirectly). Only the reduction in happiness in Study 2
mediated the effect between rejection and dishonesty. Anxiety,
a previously demonstrated mediator in the context of social
rejection (Kouchaki and Wareham, 2015), did not have a similar
effect in our studies. There are several hypothetical explanations
for the discrepancy between our findings and the existing
literature on this topic. First, social rejections may elicit a different
response than rejected efforts. The relationship between social
rejection and (social) anxiety is well explored and lies at the core
of human functioning (Baumeister and Tice, 1990; Leary, 1990).
The rejection of one’s efforts may play a less central role and
therefore have a weaker corresponding anxiety effect. A second
possible explanation could be that people behave differently
online, compared to face-to-face situations. The majority of
research on factors that affect dishonest behavior has been
conducted in lab experiments, but the few studies that have
investigated dishonesty in an online context have demonstrated
that the extent to which people behave dishonestly is affected
by the modality of their interaction. For example, Zimbler and
Feldman (2011) found that people tend behave more dishonestly
when interacting online.
A factor that may have mediated the effect between rejection
and dishonesty, but which we did not explicitly test, is fairness.
In Studies 2 and 3, we differentiated between rejections based
on objective and subjective grounds. Especially the rejections
on subjective grounds may have elicited feelings of unfairness.
Previous research has demonstrated that fairness can induce
dishonest feelings (e.g., satisfaction levels; Hegtvedt and Killian,
1999), plans (e.g., hypothetical dishonest behavior; Schweitzer
and Gibson, 2008), and even behavior (e.g., selfish behavior, Kline
et al., 2014; cheating, Houser et al., 2012; and stealing money,
Greenberg, 1993). Fairness has also proven be to an influential
factor when it comes to online behavior, as the fairness of a
request was the best predictor of honest behavior in a personal
information disclosure study (Malheiros et al., 2013). Whether
violations of fairness mediate the effect between rejection and
dishonesty, will need to be explored in future research. If fairness
turns out to be influential, firms can further experiment with
attempting to adapt their customers’ fairness perceptions. The
fairness of a situation is often ambiguous (Van den Bos et al.,
1997), and fairness perceptions can be influenced (Bies and
Shapiro, 1987; Egelman et al., 2010). In other words, violations
of fairness principles may be used to justify dishonest behavior
that is ambiguous, a factor that has repeatedly been shown
to justify dishonesty (Schweitzer and Hsee, 2002; Shalvi et al.,
2015). Therefore, investigating what factors determine whether
customers interpret a situation as fair will allow firms to promote
honest behavior by tipping the conflict between wanting to be a
good person and the benefits of dishonesty in the honest direction
(Bies and Shapiro, 1987). Transparency may be the way for firms
to see to it that their customers do not feel that lying is the right
thing to do, potentially reducing the cost of opportunistic fraud.
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